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The publication of Democratic Politics in the European Parliament (Hix et al.,
2007) presents a welcome opportunity to reflect on the significant advances
that have been made in recent years in the study of legislative organization
in the EP. It allows us to examine the present state of this field and to identify
some areas that remain under-researched and even neglected in current
research agendas. In and of itself, any study that so forcefully and convinc-
ingly confronts the conventional wisdom that the European Parliament (EP)
is an ineffectual, irrelevant institution deserves a wide readership. However,
this book represents much more than simply a study of legislative behaviour
in the only directly elected European Union (EU) institution. It addresses
much larger questions about the origins of political parties and party disci-
pline, the nature of party competition and the potential for representative
democracy in a complex political environment. This book will be of interest
not just to those immersed in the political system of the EP but also to party
scholars and legislative watchers more generally and indeed even to demo-
cratic theorists concerned about the possibility for representative democracy
in the EU.
The field of legislative politics has long been dominated by studies of the
United States Congress. This congressional research has generated a remark-
able body of scholarship, which has remained largely untested beyond the
congressional experience for too long. In the past decade however, there has
been a conscious and concerted effort on the part of EP scholars, led in no
small part by the authors of this book, to extend these theories into a com-
parative context. This book represents a very deliberate effort to connect
legislative studies of the European Parliament to this wider body of literature
and to shake off the mantle of the ‘sui generis’ approach that has frequently
and regrettably governed EU studies.
The overarching argument running through this book is that political
groups in the European Parliament have become fully institutionalized; they
dominate decision-making and are very similar animals to their national
counterparts. The bulk of the book is dedicated to demonstrating that the
political groups have become increasingly cohesive over time and that politics
in the Parliament has been ‘normalized’, in that party competition is along
ideological rather than territorial dimensions. An impressive amount of data,
both quantitative and qualitative, is marshalled to convincingly demonstrate
the validity of these arguments, and the book’s contribution to legislative
studies and EU politics is indisputable. The book combines theoretical rigour
with equally rigorous and systematic testing of the main hypotheses and it
greatly enriches and advances our understanding of the political dynamics
that operate within the European Parliament.
The first three chapters of the book present the theoretical framework for
the analysis that follows. Chapter three in particular deserves close reading; it
is here that the main theoretical argument is developed. The authors theorize
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, we should not expect to observe terri-
torial politics in action in the European Parliament. They hypothesize that
territorial conflicts are devolved to lower levels of decision-making within a
federal structure where they can be resolved most efficiently. However, certain
conflicts (particularly economic ones) generate inefficiencies if resolved at the
territorial level and that power in these policy areas is best retained at the
federal level. The theory thus predicts that party competition should be along
ideological dimensions within federal chambers and the remainder of the book
is concerned with finding confirmatory evidence to this effect. Chapters four
and five present empirical evidence that participation rates in voting have
increased over time and that cohesion has risen concomitantly with the
increasing powers of the Parliament itself. Chapter six examines whether or
not political group control of the agenda is sufficient to enforce party disci-
pline. Chapter seven considers the tension that may come to bear on members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) when there is a conflict of interests
between their national party and their EP political group. Chapters eight 
and nine examine the ideological structure of political competition in the EP,
with the former focusing on coalition formation and the latter on the dimen-
sionality of the policy space that is evident in voting behaviour. The final two
chapters provide detailed and rich case studies of recent controversial and
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high-stake votes, the ‘sacking’ of the Santer Commission and the takeover
directive, to complement the analysis in chapters four to nine. One could dwell
in detail on the many merits of this fine book, but the achievements of the
authors will be obvious to any reader and summarizing them thus seems
redundant. Therefore it is more productive to explore in the remainder of this
forum piece some of the analytical issues this book raises and the questions
and challenges it poses for legislative scholars and students of the EP in
particular.
Roll call votes
The study of legislative behaviour in Congress has relied heavily on the
analyses of roll call votes (RCVs) and the influence of this body of scholar-
ship is evident throughout this book. It is not too radical to claim that the
study of legislative behaviour has been transformed in the past two decades
by these analytical techniques. Legislative voting records clearly provide very
important information about legislative behaviour, voting cohesiveness and
perhaps, though more controversially, ideological preferences. Democratic
Politics in the European Parliament represents the culmination of an ambitious
and formidable data-collection exercise in this tradition. By collecting all roll
call votes in the European Parliament since 1979 the authors have made an
extremely valuable contribution to legislative and EU studies. Already the
data set is being widely used by scholars around the world to various ends.
Our understanding of legislative behaviour in the EP has been and will
continue to be greatly enhanced by the application to this setting of the tech-
nical tools developed for Congress. But roll call votes also have limitations
and future scholars who make use of this rich data set must be aware of,
acknowledge and correct for the problems associated with their use.
Unlike the US experience, not all votes in the EP are by roll call and this
generates significant questions about the representative characteristics of the
samples we observe. Currently roll calls number around one-third of all votes,
and we still know too little about the process by which roll calls are 
generated to conclude that this is a random sample from the universe of all
votes. Roll calls in the EP may be corrupted by strategic considerations, which
will affect the inferences we can draw from them. Indeed, even where all votes
are recorded by roll call, the range of vote choices and therefore outcomes
will be limited by the influence of pre-floor stages of legislative preparation
as well as by decisions regarding the floor agenda (Lawrence et al., 2006).
Thus, even where members have permission to vote according to their
conscience during plenary sessions, parties (particularly those with a
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majority) may constrain members’ voting behaviour by controlling the
legislative agenda. This issue aside, the more pressing and challenging
difficulty with the use of RCVs in the EP is that the majority of votes go
unrecorded.
Hix et al. (2007: 30) hold that it is not unreasonable to assume that roll call
votes are requested on the most important issues in the EP. But preliminary
research (Carrubba et al., 2006) on votes in the fifth Parliament (1999–2004)
suggest that roll calls are disproportionately called on resolutions rather than
under the co-decision procedure. Thus, legislatively consequential votes are
under-sampled, which may run counter to the argument that roll calls are
called on the most important votes. If the assumption of importance is
weakened, does this affect the inferences we draw? How might this over-
representation of votes on non-legislative issues affect our confidence in
cohesion indices or NOMINATE scores? With regard to cohesion, the 
direction of bias introduced by the over-sampling of non-legislative votes is
not by any means obvious. On the one hand, this underrepresentation of
legislative votes in the roll call sample may bias the levels of cohesion down-
wards. If most roll call votes are of little legislative consequence, do political
groups bother expending limited resources on whipping party members into
line? On the other hand, as the authors demonstrate in chapter four, 
attendance at roll call votes goes up with the legislative importance of the vote.
Is it the case that only the most loyal, career-minded MEPs turn up for votes
on resolutions? This may have the effect of inflating the actual levels of
cohesion of political groups in the EP, if such votes are over-sampled. Yet
another possibility is that the lower turnout on resolutions reflects the fact that
only those truly interested turn up, and that the subset of votes thus reflects
the interests of preference outliers. We do not know the answers to such
questions; it may very well be that attendance rates or legislative significance
are not related systematically to levels of cohesion. The countervailing
dynamics that potentially exist here suggest some interesting questions that
future analysts mining this data set will need to consider.
The authors further document that the number of roll calls has increased
dramatically over time, which may in part diminish the importance of the
above questions; as the number of votes increases, their representative nature
is likely to improve. But do these varying levels of roll calls give rise to
additional concerns about cross-parliamentary comparisons? There were
fewer than 900 roll calls in the first Parliament (1979–84), compared with over
5000 in the fifth (1999–2004). Can we have the same confidence in the results
drawn from the much smaller samples in the early Parliaments as we do in
those from the fourth and fifth Parliaments?
A more general shortcoming of the NOMINATE procedure is that it does
not typically provide uncertainty estimates (such as standard errors and
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confidence intervals). This may lead to a false sense of precision for those who
use the scores.1 A particular problem that does not seem to be of concern in
the congressional literature but may be more relevant in the European Parlia-
ment context is the large variation in member participation rates in roll calls.
In a given Parliament, some MEPs vote thousands of times whereas others
vote a mere handful of times. This reflects high absentee rates, comparatively
large turnover rates in membership between elections and, more worryingly
perhaps, strategic absences (not to be confused with official abstentions). For
instance, in the current Parliament many of the new members from East
European countries have particularly poor voting records. We can obtain
NOMINATE scores with as few as 20 votes, but it is problematic if one MEP’s
scores are calculated with 1600 votes and the scores of another with only 40
when no uncertainty estimates are generated.
To interpret the scores that are generated by NOMINATE as preference
measures is common practice in congressional work, primarily because it is
one measure of something unobservable that lies at the heart of much of what
we, as political scientists, are interested in. The authors of this book largely,
and judiciously, shy away from this particular interpretation in the context of
the EP, though the data they have generated may unwisely be utilized to this
end by others. The argument sustained throughout this book very much indi-
cates that these are not party-free measures of preferences and should not be
used as proxies for ideology. Nevertheless, preferences need to be approxi-
mated if we are to test theories of legislative decision-making or address
questions about whether or not key parliamentary bodies such as committees
are representative agents of their principal (Parliament). Alternative measures
such as elite surveys suffer from serious sample response issues, and even
this aside there is no actual obligation on those who respond to be truthful.
Measures based on constituency characteristics , which have proved popular
in the USA, are also problematic given the very vague notion of constituency
in the EP. One final possibility is to make use of the recent interest group
ratings from organizations such as Friends of the Earth, though again these
suffer from small sample size issues and may exaggerate extremism and
bipolarity (Snyder, 1992). There is clearly no silver bullet solution to the
preference measurement problem that legislative scholars confront, but cross-
validation of the various measures is recommended.
Similarly, testing spatial models of legislative behaviour fundamentally
depends on our ability to accurately gauge the number and nature of the politi-
cal dimensions on which parties compete. The authors’ analysis of roll call
voting in chapter nine demonstrates that there are broadly two dimensions on
which the political groups compete and that these dimensions have been
relatively stable over time. The first dimension fairly conclusively maps a
general left–right policy dimension, which lends weight to the overall
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argument that party competition is defined ideologically rather than terri-
torially. But the second dimension, the authors readily admit, is more difficult
to interpret substantively. It may represent some European-level govern-
ment–opposition dynamics and/or a pro-EU integration versus anti-EU
integration dimension. The interpretation of dimensions relies primarily on a
researcher’s substantive knowledge but may be complicated in the case of the
EP if selection biases are evident in roll call votes. Again the question of the
representativeness of roll calls is fundamental here. If RCVs are not repre-
sentative by issue area, this may affect the conclusions we draw about the
nature of the policy space. If roll calls are called disproportionately in certain
policy domains, this may lead to the overemphasis of particular dimensions
of conflict in NOMINATE-type analysis.
Carrubba et al. (2006) suggest that a degree of caution is required in the
interpretation of and generalization from roll calls in the European Parliament.
Overall, their work finds evidence for pooling concerns, the asymmetric use
of roll calls under different legislative procedures and the calling of RCVs
disproportionately by particular political groups (notably the Greens) and in
particular issue areas. More work on disaggregated votes may lead to in-
teresting findings; pooling RCVs on co-decisions with those on resolutions
may not be ideal without first knowing for certain that they are generated by
the same processes and whether they experience the same degree of whipping.
None of this is to argue that the use of roll calls should be abandoned but
rather their use necessitates explicit consideration of the process by which roll
calls are produced. In addition, disaggregating votes by issue area might prove
a fruitful exercise: for instance, does the subsample of votes on environmental
issues lead to a clear green policy dimension emerging? More work on compar-
ing the sample of roll calls to the universe of actual (and indeed potential)
votes would greatly enhance our confidence in the inferences we draw. Overall
these issues suggest that the analysis of roll call votes has much potential.
There is clearly scope for further development of roll call analyses through the
use of more sophisticated techniques such as Monte Carlo Markov Chain
(MCMC) modelling, which also generates uncertainty estimates. In conclusion,
the contribution of Hix et al. (2007) via the data set, which accompanies the
book, cannot be overestimated.
Moving beyond the floor
Despite the particular issues that arise with the use of RCVs in the EP, it is
convincingly demonstrated over the course of this book that the political
groups in the European Parliament have become increasingly cohesive over
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time. A crucial question that the work thus motivates is how such unity is
created. Political parties in established democracies typically exhibit such
high levels of cohesion that the question of how such discipline has arisen
has, until recently, received little attention (Bowler et al., 1999). In emerging
legislatures, however, the process of transforming rudimentary party organiz-
ations into disciplined parties is not inevitable. What mechanisms are used
to achieve this end? How party discipline arises and how it is maintained are
central questions of interest in legislative studies. Our knowledge of these
topics, however, suffers from substantial gaps, especially with regard to the
practice of party discipline outside the relatively familiar Anglo-American
setting.
If we are fully to disentangle the concepts of ideological affinity and party
discipline, we need to look beyond the voting behaviour of MEPs. A party
that is cohesive because of an affinity of ideological viewpoints and a 
party that is cohesive because its members are whipped into line are obser-
vationally equivalent when one restricts one’s analysis solely to floor voting.
Krehbiel (1993) has put the argument for affinity mostly forcefully, arguing
that parties merely reflect their members’ preferences; they provide neither
structure nor constraint. He posits that legislative outcomes (via voting) are
not the product of parliamentary party discipline but rather reflect the distri-
bution of preferences of the party’s members.
The challenge of creating cohesive political parties is not trivial in the
European Parliament. The literature on party discipline tends to focus on
electoral incentives as a means of inducing party loyalty, but the European
Parliament provides a particularly interesting case study because these
inducements are very weak, if not entirely missing. To the extent that 
electoral incentives shape much of the behaviour of political actors, the politi-
cal groups in the European Parliament are clearly greatly disadvantaged
when compared with their national counterparts. They do not control access
to the electoral ballot, they do not have resources to finance election
campaigns and, additionally, MEPs need not fear that rebellious behaviour
will force early elections. Although the prospects for cohesion appear quite
bleak, the book by Hix et al. (2007) demonstrates quite persuasively that this
has not been the experience of the political groups in the EP. Given the highly
constrained environment in which the political groups operate, how can we
account for the rise in political group cohesion? The findings of this book
motivate many questions that perhaps can be answered only by closer
examination of the activities of MEPs both within their political groups and
within the committee system.
A system of credible sanctions and rewards is one means of resolving the
collective dilemmas that all parties face. Do these sanctions and rewards exist
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internally to the EP and are they systematically used to punish and reward
party defectors and loyalists? It is almost certainly the case that intra-
parliamentary incentives to encourage cohesion operate in all legislative
bodies, but often these are overshadowed by electoral considerations. The
study of party discipline in the European Parliament allows legislative
scholars more neatly to isolate the internal and electoral factors in an actor’s
motivation structure, with implications for the general study of legislative
behaviour. The European Parliament offers scholars a particularly good case
study for demonstrating the importance of internal advancement in a politi-
cal actor’s motivations, because it is one of the few contexts in which the
electoral connection is not clearly dominant. One obvious avenue of research
is to examine whether or not those who vote against the party are sanctioned
via the loss of valuable offices within the Parliament or the political group
structure. Does the committee system, for instance, provide the political
groups with an important source of patronage, in addition to acting as a
source of policy expertise? As is the case with the US Congress, and increas-
ingly with a wide variety of legislatures across the world, committees are the
lifeblood of the European Parliament. The political groups have played a
crucial and very deliberate role in the organization of parliamentary
committees from the outset. In particular, the committee assignment process
is controlled by political groups rather than through a seniority-type norm as
in the US Congress. In addition, there is a clear hierarchy of committees, with
committee prestige largely determined by the degree of legislative powers the
EP has in a given policy jurisdiction. Positions on these high-status
committees are very much sought after by ambitious MEPs. This hierarchy
of prestige and control of the assignment process grants the party leaders
some power vis-à-vis individual MEPs. Not only has the committee system
expanded to provide ‘jobs for the boys’, but control over the committee
assignment process and committee chairs has been strongly tightened over
the years. In general, the career trajectories of MEPs and how these relate to
their behaviour on the floor (if at all) offers some wonderful research oppor-
tunities for future legislative scholars. How do MEPs’ career expectations
influence their legislative behaviour and, in turn, how does this behaviour
impact on their future career trajectories?
On a related note, the question of who controls the MEPs – national
parties or political groups – is addressed in chapter seven. The evidence here
suggests that members vote with their political group most of the time, but
there is also evidence of voting against the political group in favour of a
member’s national delegation when the two do not coincide. On a minor
statistical note, it is worth considering that in any group versus subgroup
comparison one is ‘virtually guaranteed to find that subgroups are more
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cohesive than groups’ (Desposato, 2003: 281), especially when subgroups are
small, as is the case with many national delegations. The overall result that
national parties are MEPs’ principal is a little disquieting because it suggests
that political groups are not as fully institutionalized or as powerful as
cohesion scores taken at face value might indicate. Interesting questions arise
about the nature of the relationship between national parties and their parent
political groups. Is the political group more than the sum of its national
parties? Are some national parties more privileged than others in the politi-
cal group structure, perhaps as a function of size? Can fully institutionalized
national political parties be conceived of as similar to factions within the
supranational political group? One obvious question that needs to be
addressed further is whether or not national delegations are given 
exemptions by their political group on certain votes. This may occur for
instance when matters of national importance are at stake and/or the national
party’s vote does not affect the overall success or failure of the ballot. Overall,
the results in this chapter motivate some fascinating questions about what
happens when there is incongruence between the policy positions of national
delegations and those of the political group. 
Agenda control
Chapter six of the book examines the impact of agenda-setting powers on
cohesion levels but finds little evidence to support this hypothesis. The authors
conclude that ‘parties in the European Parliament have only a limited oppor-
tunity to use their agenda setting powers to control the voting behaviour of
their backbench members’ (Hix et al., 2007: 130). Part of the problem with this
type of proposition and analysis is the great difficulty of capturing and measur-
ing the concept of agenda control in cross-sectional statistical models. Given
the proportional norms that govern procedural matters inside the EP, the effect
of agenda-setting powers will be conditional on party size, though clearly the
two issues are conceptually distinct. The results in chapter six are on the whole
weak, the explained variance of the models, despite the inclusion of upwards
of 20 variables, ranges between 1% and 4%. These models are clearly not
explaining a great deal, even though some individual coefficients are signifi-
cant. The question arises of whether or not the measures utilized are really
capturing agenda-setting powers. Do we reject the hypothesis that agenda-
setting powers are not very important in explaining cohesion levels in the EP,
or do we accept the ancillary hypothesis that the measures for such complex
concepts as agenda-setting are imprecise? Measurement is the challenge for
future scholars, and perhaps a complementary approach that examines the
McElroy Legislative Politics as Normal? 4 4 1
historical struggles over agenda-setting powers within the Parliament would
be worth pursuing. In addition, recent work by Schneider et al. (2006) high-
lights the need for better models of EU decision-making in general, particu-
larly models that incorporate the consensual norms that are the hallmark of
EU politics.
Empirical research into battles over the organization of the Parliament
and the evolution of the rules of procedure has been surprisingly limited and
mostly anecdotal to date. Apart from work by Williams (1995) and Kreppel
(2002), there is little critical analysis of the internal evolution of the Parlia-
ment.2 In the period 1979–2007 considerably more than 1000 rule changes
were proposed by the various Rules Committees. The volume of procedural
proposals is noteworthy; a great deal of parliamentary time has been dedi-
cated to structuring the institution. The formal rules of the legislative game
inside the European Parliament have been highly contested over the course
of the past 30 years, which would indicate that agenda-setting powers are not
perceived as irrelevant by the main actors. Procedural matters may not be of
pressing concern in legislatures that possess a large and disciplined majority
(Binder, 1997), but where such conditions are absent, as in the EP, legislative
rules become important tools for actors who wish to build and sustain stable
and cohesive parties. The history of the European Parliament is marked by
lengthy battles over what appear to be organizational minutiae. The amount
of effort and parliamentary time devoted to changing rules does not accord
with a non-partisan account of procedural choice. As Willi Rothley
commented in plenary in 1993, ‘[t]he Rules of Procedure are Parliament’s
Constitution. Matters affecting the Rules of Procedure are therefore always
political matters’ (14 March 1993). In addition, the timing of many changes
does not accord with changes in the external environment. The debates in
Parliament reveal that the two largest parties – the European People’s Party
(EPP) and the Party of the European Socialists (PES) – have frequently acted
in concert to shape the rules to their collective benefit.
Interpreting rule change and rule evolution can be a difficult and sub-
jective exercise because rule changes are open to multiple interpretations.
What type of evidence would be convincing corroboration of purposive and
intentional action on the part of the political groups in the EP to promote
cohesion? Is a rule that limits the speaking rights of individual members
simply an attempt to use a limited parliamentary schedule more efficiently,
or does it signal an attempt to reduce the rights of individual parliamen-
tarians? Most rule changes will appear technical and of minor consequence
even if intended for some more partisan purpose; it is in the interests of the
proposer to cloak them in neutral language. In addition, it is possible that
rules that may have profound partisan consequences down the line may not
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actually have been originally intended for this purpose. One method of over-
coming the problems inherent in interpreting rules is to examine the debates
that surrounded their introduction. Were they perceived to be only technical
by the key actors involved? The debates of the European Parliament have not
been subject to significant analyses and they are an unmined treasure trove
for those interested in the historical evolution of the institution.
The debates on the general revision of the Rules of Procedure in the first
directly elected Parliament provide an illustrative example of the potential
for this alternative and complementary approach to the vexing question of
agenda powers. Much of the debate hinged on the rights of big groups versus
small groups, but it was also asserted that the proposed revisions aimed to
quell dissent within the large political groups themselves. Mario Capanna,
speaking on behalf of the Communists declared that,
This idiotic policy with regard to the Rules of Procedure has a very specific object
in view, namely to reduce the areas of dissent within Parliament. And I mean
dissent not only among the minority groups but also within the majority groups
whether of the right, centre-right or even, occasionally, the left.3
Else Hammerick, of the small left-wing Rainbow coalition (ARC), reiterated
this point when she complained about the new proposal to limit explanations
of the vote. She argued that not only would this proposal serve to strengthen
the large political groups vis-à-vis the small ones but it would also serve to
weaken dissenting party members within the large parties.
In future only one representative of each group would be allowed an explanation
of vote before voting took place. Only one from each group, that would sub-
stantially strengthen the position of the supranational political groups with their
pecking orders and hierarchies, and correspondingly weaken those who do not
share the group’s majority views and weaken national minorities within them. In
the past explanations of vote gave these minorities a chance to speak.4
The manner and means by which elected representatives attempt to get
their own preferences aired vary from legislature to legislature, but they
broadly fall into two categories: the right to table questions and the right to
place amendments on the parliamentary agenda. Major revisions of the rules
undertaken since 1979 have effectively removed many of these privileges
from individual members. For instance, the right to table amendments in
Parliament, the right to refer a report back to committee, the right to call for
an adjournment of debate and the right to call for a debate on a matter of
urgency have all been revoked from individual MEPs. Such rights now rest
with political groups or 40 members acting in concert. With the passage of
these revisions, individual members have been emasculated. Speaking time
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has also been drastically reduced over the years. In April 1979 there was 
no limitation, for example, on the length of time a member could devote to
an ‘explanation of the vote’; by 2007 this right had been severely circum-
scribed such that a member ‘may give an oral explanation on the final vote
for not longer than one minute’ (European Parliament, 2007: 163). Rule 142
further dictates that ‘No Member may speak for more than one minute on
any of the following: the minutes, procedural motions, amendments to the
final draft agenda or to the agenda’. These policies not only stifle indepen-
dent members but also serve to stifle dissent within the larger groups.
The EP’s limits on individual rights are among the most restrictive in
Europe. Individual legislators do not possess significant speaking rights or
adjournment rights in the EP, and what rights they did have, have been
severely circumscribed over the course of the past 25 years. Over the years,
political groups have become the gatekeepers of legislative amendments and
of most interruptive and procedural motions in the EP, and even a preliminary
analysis of the debates on this matter suggest that the two largest political
groups consciously undertook these rule changes. Before we dismiss the role
of agenda-setting powers in creating political group cohesion we should
examine rule evolution in this institution in greater detail.
A dynamic party system
Parties form, fail, merge and divide on a staggering basis in the EP. Simply
keeping track of which MEPs are in which political groups and which national
parties are affiliated with which of the supranational groups is no mean feat.
It is generally the case that in the literature on political parties far too little
attention is paid ‘to the evolution of party systems between elections’ (Laver
and Benoit, 2003). The authors of this book argue that there are ‘six main
political “families” which have remained relatively consistent across all six
elected parliaments’ (Hix et al., 2007: 23) and they identify these as social
democrat, centre-right, liberal, radical left, green and anti-European. This is
not a controversial claim, but the use of six party ‘families’ as the basic unit
of analysis in parts of the book may not capture the full extent of dynamism
that exists in the EP. This dynamism in party group formation is also of
interest to the very question of cohesion. Party families do not whip members
into line and this choice of analytical unit may depress the cohesion scores
for the smaller political groups, which appear at times to have been merged
by the authors into one family. As the authors openly acknowledge, the
radical left comprised several different political groups until well into the
third Parliament. Even excluding independents, there were 10 separate
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political groups in the EP for most of the third legislative session, not six. The
number of political groups in the EP varies over time and only the three main
political groups can be thought of as party families in the traditional sense
for most of the history of the directly elected parliament.
As a general explanatory variable, party family has shortcomings when
it comes to explaining the dynamic nature of political groups in the EP.
Although capturing the broad spirit of the ideological basis on which party
groupings originally formed, the party family explanation inadequately
explains national party affiliation with EP party groups. First, party family is
an essentially static characterization, based on long-standing, ‘essential and
indelible’ (Klingemann et al., 1994: 24) issue associations and positions,
whereas national parties frequently and regularly switch EP party groups.
Second, many national parties do not belong to clearly definable party
families, either because their organizational basis does not correspond to the
classic cleavages or because they are formed primarily around new (single)
issues such as Europe or immigration. This situation characterizes many of
the parties from the eight post-communist member states.
A general problem with the concept of party family as an operational
variable is that, despite its wide use, the classification of party family remains
underspecified. Even after years of research, there exists no golden index of
party family affiliations. This problem is exacerbated when one attempts to
extend the concept of party family beyond its West European base. For
instance, there are large numbers of parties in Eastern Europe that cannot
easily be classified in terms of party families because they do not share either
an ideological heritage or associational links with their West European
counterparts. Even advocates of the party family approach and experts in the
politics of Eastern Europe cannot place these political parties definitively into
party families. For instance, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) place many parties
such as the Czech Civic Democratic Party, the Slovak Christian Democratic
Movement and the Polish Union of Real Politics into both the Liberal and
Conservative party family in their study. There is much disagreement on what
even constitutes a party family. For example, do agrarian and centre parties
form one party family or two party families? Nonetheless, the association
between party family and policies towards European integration has been
used to conclude that political contestation in the European arena is largely
driven by cleavage patterns (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks et al., 2002).
The dynamics and evolution of the party system within the EP offer a
fruitful avenue of research for party scholars. In terms of party cohesion, this
dynamism offers interesting possibilities. Are national parties or MEPs who
fail to toe the political group line forced to leave the party, or do they volun-
tarily jump ship? Do legislators alter their voting behaviour as a consequence
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of changing party affiliation? If they fail to do so, we may have evidence of
partyless voting behaviour and perhaps have more confidence in the use of
NOMINATE scores as ideological proxies. If, however, we witness change
this may be further evidence of party discipline. If legislators switch from a
more to a less disciplined party (or vice versa) and thus become subject to
shifting degrees of party instruction across roll calls, the matter becomes even
more complex (Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004). In future work one could address
these issues by dividing up the voting records of party-switchers and esti-
mating separate ideal points for the two parties they have affiliated with in
the course of a single legislative session.
Conclusion
These are exciting times for EP scholars. Better data and analytical tools have
become available in recent years that allow for much more systematic analysis
of legislative behaviour. In Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, Hix,
Noury and Roland ask many fundamental questions about the nature of
legislative organization in the European Parliament and provide many
answers. Perhaps even more importantly, this book challenges and motivates
a whole host of new puzzles, in the finest traditions of scientific research, and
deserves a very wide readership.
On a final note, this book has fulfilled its mission to connect research on
the European Parliament to the general study of legislative behaviour and
institutions in political science. The true promise and potential of EU scholar-
ship is that it provides a testing ground for extant theories of legislative
behaviour, reinforcing what we already know and offering the possibility of
falsification and, most importantly, the opportunity to broaden the trends in
legislative studies in general. It is remarkable that our understanding of
legislative politics is largely dictated by the experience of the US House of
Representatives. The similarities with the EP make for relatively easy
comparison, but it is perhaps the differences, such as the lack of an electoral
connection, that will be most instructive. How such differences influence
actors’ incentive structures and motivations and, as a consequence, their
behaviour and decision outcomes may fundamentally affect our very under-
standing of legislative politics.
Notes
This Forum article was commissioned by Gerald Schneider in the Autumn of 2006
and all editorial work was undertaken by Matthew Gabel.
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1 Though not normally provided by the standard NOMINATE package, con-
fidence intervals can be produced for NOMINATE scores; see Lewis and
Poole (2004).
2 For similar work on the Council of Ministers, see Carrubba and Volden (2001).
For an account of procedural choice and rule evolution across the European
Union as a whole, see Jupille (2004).
3 Debates of the European Parliament, 8 July 1980.
4 Debates of the European Parliament, 26 March 1981.
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